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Abstract 
Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds 
that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is 
empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables 
behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it 
is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical 
adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. Therefore, 
the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical 
one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter. 
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1. Introduction 
The term ‘surrealism’ refers to a philosophical position that is meant to be a surrogate for 
scientific realism (Leplin, 1987). This paper defines it as the view that observables behave as 
if T were true, and scientific realism as the view that T, a theory, is true. Surrealism is 
regarded as an alternative to scientific realism not only by Jarrett Leplin (1987) but also by 
other eminent philosophers, such as Alan Musgrave (1988, 2017), P. Kyle Stanford (2000), 
Timothy Lyons (2003), and Moti Mizrahi (2012). This paper exposes a problem with 
surrealism, thereby presenting an important philosophical lesson – we should distinguish 
between two kinds of explanations: conceptual and empirical ones. 
Philosophers have proposed surrealism as a way of explaining why T is successful and 
why T is empirically adequate. There are many differences between these two explananda. 
One of them is that the success of T implies that some observational consequences of T are 
true, whereas the empirical adequacy of T implies that all observational consequences of T 
are true. The history of science abounds in successful theories that were empirically 
inadequate (Lange, 2002: 282; Lyons, 2003: 898). For example, the Ptolemaic theory and the 
miasma theory were successful, but empirically inadequate. In addition to the truth of some 
observational consequences, T must meet other conditions to be successful, e.g., the auxiliary 
condition, the technological condition, and the financial condition. I only bring readers’ 
attention to Park (2016: 604–605) for the explication of these other conditions. 
This paper is concerned not with the surrealist explanation that T is successful because 
observables behave as if it were true, but with the surrealist explanation that T is empirically 
adequate because observables behave as if it were true. The former has already been 
criticized in detail (Park, 2016: 610–614). Put briefly, scientists deserve credit for the success 
of T, but the surrealist explanation attributes the credit not to scientists but to the world, 
thereby disappointing scientists. To use an analogy, imagine that the Wright brothers worked 
hard to invent the airplane, but surrealists came along and said to the Wright brothers that the 
air plane could fly “because there was air in the sky” (Park, 2016: 612). Such an explanation 
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would have failed to recognize the Wright brothers’ accomplishment and would have 
disappointed them. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I appeal to the correspondence 
theory of truth to argue that saying that T is true is different from saying that the world is as T 
says it is. In Section 3, I argue that saying that T is empirically adequate is also different from 
saying that observables behave as if it were true. Hence, it is not a circular explanation that T 
is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true, contrary to what 
Musgrave (1988, 2017) contends. In Section 4, I argue that the surrealist explanation is a 
trivial one for those who are already familiar with the concept of empirical adequacy. In 
addition, I distinguish between conceptual and empirical explanations, classifying the 
surrealist explanation as conceptual and the realist explanation as empirical. In Section 5, I 
reply to two objections. This paper can be useful to those who are interested in whether 
surrealism is an alternative to realism, under what conditions an explanation is appropriate, 
and how conceptual explanations differ from empirical ones. 
 
2. The Correspondence Theory of Truth 
If you ask correspondentists, theorists who espouse the correspondence theory of truth, to 
explain why T is true, they will put forward the correspondentist explanation that T is true 
because it corresponds to the world, i.e., because the world is as T says it is. The 
correspondentist explanation is composed of the following two statements:  
 
(T) T is true. 
(W) The world is as T says it is. 
 
Are (T) and (W) substantially different assertions? Or are they merely different expressions 
of the same assertion? In my view, they are substantially different assertions. (T) is an 
assertion about T, whereas (W) is an assertion about the world. (T) attributes a semantic 
property to T, whereas (W) attributes a certain manner of existence to the world. (T) and (W) 
cannot be mere verbal variants because they are different assertions about different targets. 
If (T) and (W) were mere verbal variants, the correspondence theory would be a 
vacuous theory of truth. The correspondence theory, however, is not a vacuous theory of 
truth. It rather makes a substantive claim about what makes a statement true, viz., the world is 
what makes a statement true. Unlike other theories of truth, it claims that the world serves as 
the truth-maker for true statements (Goldman, 1999: 61). Of course, if correspondentists 
believe (T), they can infer (W), and vice versa. After all, that is what it means to embrace the 
correspondence theory. It does not follow, however, that (W) is merely a verbal variant of (T). 
It is one thing that we can infer (W) from (T) and vice versa; it is another that they are mere 
verbal variants. 
When correspondentists propose that T is true if and only if the world is as T says it is, 
they are engaged in a conceptual analysis of the concept of truth. They aim to identify the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of T. To this end, they claim that if the world 
were not as T says it is, T would not be true, i.e., that correspondence to the world is a 
necessary condition for the truth of T. They also claim that if the world were as T says it is, T 
would be true, i.e., that correspondence to the world is a sufficient condition for the truth of 
T. A conceptual analysis is not an a posteriori enterprise but an a priori enterprise. While an 
a posteriori enterprise involves an investigation into the world, an a priori enterprise does 
not. Correspondentists are not making any inductive inferences about the world, but are 
laying bare the concept of truth. 
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Consider the proposal that the special theory of relativity is true because the world is as 
it says it is. Does this proposal merely repeat the same assertion? Or does it say something 
interesting about why the special theory of relativity is true? If you think that (W) is just a 
fancy way of saying (T), you would immediately think that it is vacuous to say that the 
special theory of relativity is true because the world is as it says it is. By contrast, if you think 
that (T) and (W) are substantially different assertions, you would think that the proposal says 
something interesting about why the special theory of relativity is true. (T) and (W) are 
substantially different assertions, as we have seen above. Therefore, it is not circular to say 
that the special theory of relativity is true because the world is as it says it is. 
This conclusion will serve as a theoretical resource for me to refute Musgrave’s 
objection to surrealism in the next section. 
 
3. The Refutation of Musgrave’s View 
What does it mean to say that observables behave as if T were true? It means “that observable 
events occur as T says they do” (Park, 2016: 606). What about unobservable events? They 
may or may not occur as T says they do, i.e., it is open to question whether unobservables 
behave or do not behave as T says they do. T would be true if both observables and 
unobservables behave as it says they do. However, in order for T to be empirically adequate, 
it is only necessary that observables behave as T says they do. What if observables behave as 
T says they do, but unobservables do not behave as T says they do? T would be empirically 
adequate but false. Thus, surrealists believe that T is empirically adequate, but do not believe 
that it is true. 
Now that we are clear about the content of surrealism, we are ready to appraise the 
surrealist explanation that T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were 
true. The surrealist explanation is comprised of the following two statements: 
 
(E) T is empirically adequate. 
(O) Observables behave as if T were true. 
 
Musgrave contends that (E) and (O) are not substantially different assertions but mere verbal 
variants. For him, saying that observables behave as if T were true “is just a fancy way of 
saying that T is observationally or empirically adequate” (1988: 243). He insists that “saying 
that the phenomena are as if the theory were true is just saying that the theory is empirically 
adequate” (2017: 78). He also maintains that “to say that a theory is empirically adequate is 
just to say that the phenomena are as if it were true” (2017: 76).  
Musgrave’s linguistic intuition led him to the view that (E) and (O) are merely different 
formulations of the same assertion, and his linguistic intuition is not groundless. We can infer 
(O) from (E) and vice versa. For example, the belief that the special theory of relativity is 
empirically adequate entitles us to infer that observables behave as if it were true. The belief 
that observables behave as if it were true entitles us to infer that it is empirically adequate. 
After all, that is what it is to embrace (E) or (O). So it appears that (E) and (O) are mere 
verbal variants. Musgrave’s view about (E) and (O) holds an important implication regarding 
the surrealist explanation. If his view is true, the surrealist explanation is circular, i.e., (O) is 
(E) in disguise. Hence, the surrealist explanation amounts to explaining “the empirical 
adequacy of a theory in terms of its empirical adequacy” (Musgrave, 2017: 84). 
In my view, however, (E) and (O) are not mere verbal variants, but substantially 
different assertions. (E) is an assertion about T, whereas (O) is an assertion about the world. 
(E) claims that T has a certain semantic property, viz., empirical adequacy. By contrast, (O) 
claims that observables behave in a certain manner. Thus, (E) and (O) are different claims 
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about different targets. Consider also that (E) is merely the restriction of (T) to observational 
claims, while (O) is merely the restriction of (W) to observables. So if (T) and (W) are 
substantially different assertions, (E) and (O) are also substantially different assertions. As we 
have seen in Section 2, (T) and (W) are substantially different assertions. Therefore, (E) and 
(O) are also substantially different assertions, pace Musgrave. 
Musgrave takes (E) and (O) to be mere verbal variants, despite the fact that (E) is a 
claim about T, whereas (O) is a claim about the world. So it is natural for him to suggest that 
the truth of T explains why observables behave as if it were true. He says, “T’s actually being 
true is the best explanation of why all the observable phenomena are as if it were true” (2017: 
83). Note that he explains the behavior of the world in terms of the semantic property of T. 
In my view, however, it is wrong to do so. The world behaves as it does irrespective of 
how we describe it. For example, heat is as it is, and it behaves as it does, regardless of 
whether we describe it as caloric fluid or as the mean kinetic energy of molecules. It is 
incoherent to say that cold and hot objects in contact with each other assume the average 
temperature because the kinetic theory is true. By contrast, it is coherent to say that cold and 
hot objects assume the average temperature because the fast-moving molecules of the hot 
object slow down and the slow-moving molecules of the cold object move faster. In general, 
an event should be explained not in terms of a semantic property but in terms of another 
event. 
Of course, we can make an inference from the truth of T to the behavioral pattern of 
observables. It does not follow, however, that we can explain the behavioral pattern of 
observables in terms of the truth of T. It has become an accepted point in philosophy of 
science that inference and explanation are two different affairs. As Sylvain Bromberger 
(1966) has pointed out, it is legitimate to infer the length of the flagpole from the length of 
the shadow, but illegitimate to explain the length of a flagpole in terms of the length of its 
shadow. 
Let me present a thought experiment to make my foregoing objection more convincing. 
Imagine a possible world in which God changes the way the world behaves via changing the 
truth-values of T. For example, God invests the theory of gravity with truth during the day but 
with falsity at night, so an apple falls downwards in the daytime, but rises upwards at night. 
God does not directly change the way the world behaves. He rather does so by changing the 
truth-values of the theory of gravity. Thus, the semantic property of the theory of gravity is 
the immediate cause of the way this possible world behaves. In such a possible world, it 
would be legitimate to explain an event in terms of a semantic property. For example, it 
would make perfect sense to say that the apple falls down because the theory of gravity is 
true. 
In the actual world, however, it is wrong to say that observables behave as T says they 
do because it is true, or to say that observables behave as if T were true because it is 
empirically adequate. Such explanations are all conceptually flawed. It is only legitimate to 
explain the semantic property of the truth or empirical adequacy of T in terms of how the 
world behaves. So we can say that T is true because the world behaves as T says it does, or 
that T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. In other words, 
in the actual world, (W) can explain (T), but not vice versa, and (O) can explain (E), but not 
vice versa. This asymmetric explanatory relation of (T) and (W) further shows that they are 
substantially different assertions, and that the correspondentist explanation is not circular. 
Similarly, the asymmetric explanatory relation of (E) and (O) further shows that they are 
substantially different assertions, and that the surrealist explanation is not circular either. 
One might attempt to defend Musgrave’s view about the surrealist explanation by 
appealing to deflationism, an alternative to the correspondence theory. According to 
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deflationism, ‘It is true that p’ means no more than p, i.e., ‘It is true that p’ and ‘p’ are 
equivalent statements. It follows that (T) and (W) are equivalent. Given that (E) and (O) are 
just the restrictions of (T) and (W) to observables, (E) and (O) are also equivalent. It follows 
that (E) and (O) are mere verbal variants. Thus, under deflationism, Musgrave is right after 
all.  
It is doubtful, however, that Musgrave would endorse the preceding deflationist 
defense of his view that the surrealist explanation is circular. He says that “The aim of 
science, realists tell us, is to have true theories about the world, where ‘true’ is understood in 
the classical correspondence sense” (1988: 229). In short, Musgrave operates under the 
correspondence theory when he argues that (E) and (O) are mere verbal variants, so the 
surrealist explanation is circular. 
So far, I have argued that (E) and (O) are substantially different assertions, so the 
surrealist explanation is not circular. Let me now turn to the confrontation between the 
surrealist explanation and the realist explanation that T is empirically adequate because it is 
true. The surrealist explanation invokes the behavioral pattern of observables, whereas the 
realist explanation invokes the truth of T, to explain why T is empirically adequate. Neither 
the surrealist explanation nor the realist explanation suffers from a conceptual problem.  
André Kukla (1998), Lyons (2003), and Mizrahi (2012) would take the surrealist 
explanation as a serious alternative to the realist explanation. Kukla states that the 
“observable world behaves as if our theories are true” (1998: 22). In a similar vein, Lyons 
claims that the “mechanisms postulated by the theory and its auxiliaries would, if actual, 
bring about all relevant phenomena thus far observed and some yet to be observed at time t; 
and these phenomena are brought about by actual mechanisms in the world” (2003: 900). 
Mizrahi also says that the “observable world behaves as if our mature scientific theories are 
true” (2012: 133). He would say that there is no good reason to prefer the realist explanation 
over the surrealist explanation because the realist explanation is empirically no better than the 
realist explanation, i.e., “both make the same testable predictions” (2012: 133). 
Which one is better, the realist explanation or the surrealist explanation? Musgrave 
prefers the realist explanation to the surrealist explanation on the grounds that the surrealist 
explanation is circular. He argues that “truth explains empirical adequacy better than 
empirical adequacy does, because the latter ‘explanation’ is completely circular” (2017: 87). 
As we have seen, however, the surrealist explanation is not vacuous. Hence, we are still left 
with the question: Which explanation is better? I defend my answer to this question in the 
next section. 
 
4. The Real Problem 
In general, an explanation is appropriate when it serves the explainers’ purposes and/or the 
explainees’ purposes, and is inappropriate when it serves the purposes of neither. Suppose 
that a jet airliner crashes, and that investigators rush to the crash site. After investigating the 
wreckage, they hold a news conference. They announce, to the surprise of news reporters, 
that the jet airliner crashed due to the gravitational force between it and the Earth. This 
explanation, although conceptually sound, is inappropriate because it serves neither the 
explainers’ nor the explainees’ purposes. It merely makes an obvious point that interests 
neither the explainers nor the explainees. Such an explanation might, however, be appropriate 
in science classrooms, in which teachers aim to convey the concept of gravity to students. It 
would serve both the teachers’ purpose to teach the concept of gravity and the students’ 
purpose to learn the new concept. This story suggests that explainers’ and explainees’ 
purposes determine whether an explanation is appropriate or not. 
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This general point applies to the surrealist explanation. The surrealist explanation is 
appropriate when it serves the explainers’ and/or explainees’ purposes, and is inappropriate 
when it serves neither. Suppose that professors wish to share the concept of empirical 
adequacy with students in a philosophy of science class. Under these circumstances, the 
surrealist explanation would be appropriate because it would prove illuminating to students 
who were previously unfamiliar with the concept of empirical adequacy, enabling them to 
grasp both the relationship between empirical adequacy and observables, and the relationship 
between empirical adequacy and truth. The surrealist explanation would serve both the 
explainers’ purpose and the explainees’ purpose. 
What if the explainers and explainees are already familiar with the concept of empirical 
adequacy? The surrealist explanation, although conceptually sound, would be inappropriate. 
It would merely make an obvious point that interests no one, just as the investigators’ 
gravitational explanation above makes an obvious point that interests no one. Hence, the 
surrealist explanation would serve no one’s purpose. 
Surrealists might reply that even if explainers and explainees are already familiar with 
the concept of empirical adequacy, the surrealist explanation can nevertheless serve a certain 
purpose, viz., to undermine the no-miracles argument (Putnam, 1975: 73). The no-miracles 
argument was originally constructed to explain not the empirical adequacy of T but the 
success of T. It, however, can be recast to explain the empirical adequacy of T. The recast 
version would hold that the empirical adequacy of T would be a miracle if T were false, so 
the truth of T best explains the empirical adequacy of T. The argument maintains “not just 
that truth explains empirical adequacy, but that it is the only explanation, or at least the best 
explanation” (Musgrave, 2017: 84). Surrealists, by providing an alternative to the realist 
explanation, have imposed upon scientific realists the burden of proving that the realist 
explanation is better than the surrealist explanation. Consequently, the surrealist explanation 
is an appropriate one in the scientific realism debate. 
It is, however, debatable whether the surrealist explanation is an alternative to the 
realist explanation. The surrealist explanation is a conceptual analysis laying bare the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the empirical adequacy of T, just as the 
correspondentist explanation is a conceptual analysis laying bare the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the truth of T. Surrealists do not make an inductive inference about T, any more 
than correspondentists make an inductive inference about T. After all, the surrealist 
explanation is just the restriction of the correspondentist explanation to observational claims 
and observables. It is for this reason that if you were already familiar with the concept of 
empirical adequacy, you would immediately accept the surrealist explanation. If you do not 
accept the surrealist explanation, that shows not that you refuse to make an inductive 
inference about T, but that you do not understand what it means to say that T is empirically 
adequate. In short, the surrealist explanation is not an inductive inference but a clarification 
of a concept. 
By contrast, when realists advance the realist explanation, they are in the business of 
making an inductive inference about T. From the premise that T is empirically adequate, they 
inductively infer that it is true. They are not in the business of clarifying the concept of 
empirical adequacy. They do not say that the explanans is the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the explanandum. After all, it is obviously false that the truth of T is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the empirical adequacy of T. The realist explanation 
involves an inductive inference from the empirical adequacy of T to the truth of T. For this 
reason, antirealists reject the realist explanation, even if they are already familiar with the 
concept of empirical adequacy. They reject the realist explanation not because they do not 
understand what it means to say that T is empirically adequate, but because they are not 
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willing to run the epistemic risk involved in the inductive inference. In short, the realist 
explanation involves not a clarification of a concept but an inductive inference. 
The difference between the surrealist explanation and the realist explanation discussed 
above calls for the distinction between what I call conceptual and empirical explanations. A 
conceptual explanation is an attempt to illuminate a concept by providing a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for it. The former is called an analysandum, and the latter is called an 
analysans. No inductive inference is made from the analysandum to the analysans. By 
contrast, an empirical explanation is an attempt to illuminate an explanandum by providing 
an explanans. An inductive inference is made from the explanandum to the explanans. The 
surrealist explanation exemplifies a conceptual explanation, whereas the realist explanation 
exemplifies an empirical explanation.  
Consider now how the surrealist explanation and the realist explanation could be 
refuted. We can conceive of some counterexamples, some scientific theories, that drive a 
wedge between the explanandum and the explanans of the realist explanation. Suppose that 
von Neumann and Dirac’s version of quantum mechanics is empirically adequate, and that it 
is empirically equivalent to Bohm’s version of quantum mechanics. Given that they make 
incompatible claims about unobservables, they are empirically adequate rivals, and they 
would constitute counterexamples undermining the realist inference from the empirical 
adequacy of T to the truth of T, i.e., from the explanandum to the explanans of the realist 
explanation. In contrast, we cannot even conceive of counterexamples undercutting the 
surrealist inference from the analysandum to the analysans. Suppose that critics of surrealism 
present certain scientific theories, and then say that though they are empirically adequate, 
observables do not behave as if the theories were true. What they say would indicate not that 
the scientific theories are counterexamples to the surrealist explanation, but that they do not 
know what it is for T to be empirically adequate. In short, the realist explanation is subject to 
an empirical refutation whereas the surrealist explanation is not. This difference provides 
further support for my view that the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the 
realist explanation is an empirical one. 
What can we conclude from my view that with the surrealist explanation, surrealists 
are engaged in the a priori enterprise of clarifying the concept of empirical adequacy, 
whereas with the realist explanation, realists are in the a posteriori enterprise of making an 
inductive inference from the empirical adequacy of T to the truth of T? We can conclude that 
the surrealist explanation cannot be an alternative to the realist explanation. To use an 
analogy, there are many kinds of apples: Red Delicious, Granny Smith, Yellow Newton, etc. 
Suppose that you claim that Red Delicious is the most delicious apple. I present you with an 
orange, and request that you prove that Red Delicious apples taste better than the orange. You 
would immediately object that my request is illegitimate, saying that you were talking about 
apples, but not about oranges. Realists can say the same thing about surrealists’ request to 
prove that the realist explanation is better than the surrealist explanation. When realists say 
that the realist explanation is the best explanation of the empirical adequacy of T, they mean 
that the realist explanation is the best empirical explanation. The surrealist explanation is not 
an empirical one but a conceptual one. It follows that the surrealist explanation cannot be an 
alternative to the realist explanation, and that it is wrong to say that the surrealist explanation 
undermines the realist contention that the realist explanation is the best empirical explanation 
of the empirical adequacy of T. 
Surrealists might now go on the offensive against the realist explanation. What purpose 
does the realist explanation serve? My answer is that it serves the realist purpose of arriving 
at the realist explanans that T is true, i.e., realists claim that T is true on the grounds that the 
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truth of T best explains the empirical adequacy of T. Since the realist explanation serves the 
realist purpose of supporting the truth of T, it is appropriate in the scientific realism debate. 
Such a defense cannot be made for the surrealist explanation. Surrealists cannot say 
that the surrealist explanation serves the surrealist purpose of arriving at the analysans that 
observables behave as if T were true. After all, the analysans is nothing but the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the analysandum that T is empirically adequate. The surrealist 
explanation only clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, just as the correspondentist 
explanation only clarifies the concept of truth. It follows that surrealists can only say that the 
surrealist explanation serves the purpose of analyzing the concept of empirical adequacy, just 
as the correspondentist explanation serves the purpose of analyzing the concept of truth. 
Interestingly, the surrealists’ analysandum coincides with the realists’ explanandum. 
Both realists and surrealists are explaining why T is empirically adequate. Clarifying the 
concept of empirical adequacy is not only what surrealists should do, but also what realists 
should do. After all, if the concept of empirical adequacy is obscure, it is pointless for realists 
to say that the truth of T best explains the empirical adequacy of T. It follows that surrealists 
are helping realists by providing the surrealist explanation of empirical adequacy, and that 
realists should endorse the surrealist explanation.  
 
5. Objections and Replies 
I argued above that (E) and (O) are not mere verbal variants but substantially different 
assertions. Recall that (E) and (O) are as follows: 
 
(E) T is empirically adequate. 
(O) Observables behave as if T were true. 
 
Surrealists might insist that (E) and (O) are mere verbal variants on the grounds that they 
parallel (1) and (2): 
 
(1) A term refers. 
(2) The world contains something that is picked out by the term. 
 
(1) and (2) are mere verbal variants, although (1) is a claim about a term, whereas (2) is a 
claim about the world. It follows that (E) and (O) are also mere verbal variants, although (E) 
is a claim about T, whereas (O) is a claim about the world.  
My replies are two-fold. First, (1) and (2) parallel the analysandum and the analysans 
of the correspondentist explanation, (T) and (W):  
 
(T) T is true. 
(W) The world is as T says it is. 
 
It follows that if (1) and (2) were mere verbal variants, (T) and (W) would also be mere 
verbal variants. As we have seen in Section 2, however, (T) and (W) are not mere verbal 
variants but substantially different assertions. Therefore, (1) and (2) are also not mere verbal 
variants but substantially different assertions. 
Second, just as (W) is more fundamental than (T), so (2) is more fundamental than (1). 
It follows that just as (W) can explain (T), but not vice versa, so (2) can explain (1), but not 
vice versa. It sounds right to say that T is true because the world is as T says it is. In contrast, 
it sounds wrong to say that the world is as T says it is because T is true. Analogously, it 
sounds right to say that a term refers because the world contains something that is picked out 
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by the term. By contrast, it sounds wrong to say that the world contains something that is 
picked out by a term because the term refers. This asymmetrical explanatory relation between 
(1) and (2) further indicates that (1) and (2) are substantially different assertions. 
Moreover, it sounds wrong to say that an object exists because its term refers in the 
actual world. It sounds right to say so only in a possible world in which God makes objects 
come into being and pass out of being by changing the semantic properties of terms. For 
example, imagine that God makes ‘electron’ refer during the day and not refer at night. As a 
result, an electron exists during the day, but does not exist at night. In such a possible world, 
it makes perfect sense to say that an electron exists because ‘electron’ refers. 
Let me now turn to a different objection. Berkeleyan idealists would say that T is 
empirically adequate not because observables behave as if it were true, but because God 
implants certain ideas in my mind as if it were true. Surrealists would retort that T is 
empirically adequate not because God implants certain ideas in my mind as if it were true, 
but because observables behave as if it were true. Thus, surrealists make an inductive 
inference about the world, i.e., they inductively infer that observables, as opposed to certain 
ideas in my mind, behave as if T were true. Since the surrealist explanation makes an 
inductive inference, it is an empirical explanation, and it is an alternative to the realist 
explanation.  
This objection, although brilliant, can be reduced to absurdity. If the surrealist 
explanation were an empirical one for the reason stated above, the correspondentist 
explanation would also be an empirical one for a similar reason. When correspondentists say 
that T is true because the world is as T says it is, they are making an inductive inference about 
the world, i.e., they are inductively inferring that the material world, as opposed to the ideal 
world, is as T says it is. To go further, it would also be an empirical explanation to say that 
John is a bachelor because he is an unmarried adult male. When you give this explanation, 
you are inductively inferring that the combination of John’s body and mind, as opposed to a 
collection of my ideas, is an unmarried adult male. These two explanations, however, are not 
empirical ones but conceptual ones. Therefore, the surrealist explanation is also a conceptual 
one.  
The fact that the foregoing objection falls prey to a reductio ad absurdum indicates that 
there is an intrinsic problem with it. The intrinsic problem is that it involves a sudden change 
of frameworks from the materialist framework to the idealist framework. It is due to this 
change of frameworks that the surrealist explanation becomes an empirical one making an 
inductive inference about the world. If the framework did not change, the surrealist 
explanation would consistently be a conceptual one clarifying the concept of empirical 
adequacy. 
Let me flesh out this abstract point. Under the materialist framework, to say that T is 
empirically adequate means that observables behave as if it were true. It does not mean that 
certain ideas occur in my mind as if T were true. After all, T would not be empirically 
adequate, even if certain ideas occurred in my mind as if it were true, if observables did not 
behave as if it were true. Once surrealists adopt the materialist framework and say that T is 
empirically adequate, they have no choice but to say that T is empirically adequate because 
observables behave as if it were true. They cannot say that T is empirically adequate because 
certain ideas occur in my mind as if it were true. To say so is to change the framework 
suddenly from the materialist framework to the idealist framework.  
By contrast, under the idealist framework, to say that T is empirically adequate means 
that certain ideas occur in my mind as if it were true. This does not mean that observables, 
immaterial objects, behave as if T were true. Once surrealists adopt the idealist framework 
and say that T is empirically adequate, they have no choice but to say that T is empirically 
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adequate because certain ideas occur in my mind as if it were true. They cannot say that T is 
empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. To say so is to change the 
framework suddenly from the idealist framework to the materialist framework.  
In short, if surrealists interpret the analysandum, (E), under the materialist framework, 
they should provide a materialist analysans. If they interpret it under the idealist framework, 
they should provide an idealist analysans. Following these rules would inevitably result in 
conceptual explanations. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Just as the correspondentist explanation makes it clear that the world makes T true, so the 
surrealist explanation makes it clear that the world makes T empirically adequate. In other 
words, just as the correspondentist explanation claims that the world is the truth-maker of T, 
so the surrealist explanation claims that observables are the empirical-adequacy-maker of T. 
It follows that it is not circular to say that T is empirically adequate because observables 
behave as if it were true, any more than it is circular to say that T is true because the world is 
as T says it is. By making these claims, both correspondentists and surrealists are engaged in 
conceptual analyses, attempting to lay bare the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
truth and empirical adequacy of T, respectively. 
The surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an 
empirical one. The surrealist explanation merely clarifies the analysandum in terms of the 
analysans, whereas the realist explanation involves an inductive inference from the 
explanandum to the explanans. The surrealist explanation is a trivial one for those who are 
already familiar with the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation is 
not a trivial one for those who are already familiar with the concept of truth. In sum, the 
surrealist explanation is different in kind from the realist explanation, and surrealism is not an 
alternative to scientific realism. 
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